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Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar 
Boston University School of Law 
 
Introduction 
In 2005, a draft of what was then entitled Restatement (Third) Torts: Liability for Physical Harm 
concluded that there was a “scarcity of judicial opinions that have seriously called into question” the 
intentional tort doctrines set forth in the 1965 Restatement (Second) of Torts,” and that “[a]ccordingly, 
the Restatement (Second) remains largely authoritative in explaining the details of [those doctrines].”1 
Consequently, the American Law Institute did not intend to include an intentional torts project as part of 
the Restatement (Third) Torts (“Third Restatement”).2 
This view was not without its dissenters. Kenneth Simons agreed that restating intentional tort 
doctrine “should not be highest on the agenda of the ALI;”3 however, he also observed that there were a 
number of unresolved issues in intentional tort doctrine, which he argued contained far more 
complexity than the ALI had previously acknowledged.4  In a selective review of doctrinal developments 
in battery since the Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Second Restatement”), Professor Simons described 
several important debates in the case law, including the nature of the required intent (dual intent or 
single intent) and the difficulty of distinguishing between battery and negligence in medical treatment 
cases in which the patient alleges that the physician acted without the patient’s consent. 5 
Ellen Bublick, on the other hand, urged that the ALI undertake an intentional torts project, not 
for the purpose of resolving current debates over doctrine, but rather to attempt to create “a coherent 
whole” 6 with other parts of the Third Restatement by “articulating a principled and useful (if imperfect 
and impermanent) structure.”7 She then proposed two alternative methods of reorganizing and better 
integrating parts of intentional tort doctrine: (1) creating a “baseline principle of liability for intentional 
                                                          
1 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. For Physical Harm § 5 cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).That project 
was subsequently expanded to include emotional as well as physical harm. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (2010).  
2 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. For Physical & Emotional Harm xi-xii (2010) (describing content of 
completed first volume and projected second and final volume), cited in Nancy J. Moore, “Intent and Consent in 
the Tort of Battery,” 61 Amer. U. L. Rev. 1585, 1587 & n. 3 (2012). 
3 Kenneth W. Simons, “A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts,” 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 1061, 1062 (2006). 
4 See id.  
5 See id. at 1065-1079. 
6 See Ellen M. Bublick, “A Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional Harm to Persons---Thoughts,” 44 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 1335 (2009). 
7 Id. at 1336. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3059046 
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physical harm”8 and “pairing it with a rule outlining exceptions,”9 which would require “[r]ealiging” 
aspects of intentional torts that protect interests other than physical harm;10 or (2) maintaining “the 
historical shape of the trespassory torts”11 but then seeking to identify “a core of culpable, entitlement-
destructive torts that warrant extended liability for defendants and diminished requisites for avoidance 
by plaintiffs.”12 
Professor Simons had considered the possibility of reorganizing intentional tort doctrine along 
the lines of the first alternative proposed by Professor Bublick, that is, adopting umbrella rules for 
intentionally causing physical harm, for intentionally causing emotional harm, and for intentionally 
causing economic harm.13 Ultimately, however, he rejected this approach as neither realistic nor 
justifiable in principle.14 As for the need to at least identify a core of culpable torts reflecting extended 
liability, Professor Simons rejected the concept of a “hierarchy of fault,”15 preferring to recognize 
intentional torts as “an alternative paradigm of tort doctrine,”16 which adopts “multiple fault elements 
[even] within a single tort doctrine.”17 As for “ancillary doctrines” that sometimes “piggy-back” on the 
identification of a tort as an intentional tort (often simply assuming the hierarchy of fault principle), 
Professor Simons suggested that the key is to apply the ancillary doctrines in a more “discriminating 
way.”18 Thus “[t]he simple fact that the defendant has committed an ‘intentional’ tort should not be 
conclusive of whether the defendant should pay punitive damages, whether the plaintiff is precluded 
from obtaining insurance or workers’ compensation coverage for the defendant’s tort, or whether a 
liability judgment should be nondischargeable in bankruptcy.”19 In the end, Professor Simons concluded 
that a new Third Restatement of intentional torts should aim to “accurately depict[] existing doctrine, 
clarify its concepts, and mak[e] visible the normative commitments that the doctrine embodies.”20 
In 2013, Professor Simons was appointed as a co-reporter of the Restatement of the Law Third 
Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons (“Intentional Torts”).21 Shortly thereafter he assumed the role of 
principal reporter.22 Not surprisingly, the overall approach the project has taken corresponds with 
Professor Simons’s earlier views. Thus the project has maintained the historical division of the specific, 
                                                          
8 Id. at 1339. 
9 Id. at 1341. 
10 Id. at 1345. 
11 Id. at 1346. 
12 Id. at 1347. 
13 See Simons, supra note 3 at Part III.B 
14 See id. at 1085. 
15 See id. at Part III.C. 
16 Id. at 1097 
17 Id. at 1090. 
18 Id. at 1096. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 1102. 
21 He was appointed co-reporter along with Ellen Pryor. See, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to 
Persons v (Prelim. Draft No. 1) (Aug. 28, 2013). 
22 Professor Pryor withdrew as co-reporter (presumably when she became associate dean at North Texas Law 
School in Dallas) and then briefly served as an associate reporter. When she withdrew from that role as well, 
Jonathan Cardi became an associate reporter to the project. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to 
Persons v  (Prelim. Draft No. 3 (Mar. 11, 2016). 
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individual trespassory torts to persons,23 clarified many of the existing ambiguities, resolved various 
doctrinal debates, and explained why one approach is taken over another in view of the competing 
policy concerns.24 Moreover, as we might have anticipated,  the project purports to reject the hierarchy 
of fault principle,25 although the commentary suggests from time to time that certain collateral 
doctrines, such as an extended scope of liability, should not apply when liability exists without 
substantial fault.26 If there are any surprises, it is that the reporters have been so willing to push the 
boundaries of existing doctrine, recommending extensions that the ALI membership sometimes adopts, 
despite the almost total lack of existing case law (for example, recognizing an entirely new tort of 
purposeful infliction of bodily harm, without any bodily contact),27 and sometimes rejects (for example, 
defining “offensive contact” to include conduct that is “highly offensive to the other’s unusually 
sensitive sense of personal dignity [when] the actor knows that the contact will be highly offensive to 
the other”).28  
I agree with what I will characterize as the overall Simons approach. It would have been 
extraordinarily difficult to radically reorganize the contours of existing tort doctrine in the manner 
proposed by Professor Bublick, even if limited to attempting for each individual tort to explicitly identify 
when a tort’s status as an intentional tort warrants extended liability. Moreover, the Intentional Torts 
project has been extraordinarily successful in clarifying existing doctrine in numerous instances.29 The 
reporters provide exhaustive explanations of the choices made when there is a split of authority,30 
                                                          
23 Although the reporters did not expressly address this issue, it was clear from the beginning that they would 
proceed with the historical division of the intentional torts to persons---battery (harmful and offensive), assault, 
intentional infliction of emotional harm, and false Imprisonment. See Restatement (Third) of Torts xi (Prelim. Draft 
No. 1) (Aug. 28, 2013). 
24 See, e.g., infra Notes 78-79 & accompanying text (discussing reporters’ resolution of the debate over single 
versus dual intent in the tort of battery). 
25 See infra 120-22 & accompanying text. 
26 See Restatement of the Law Third Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons, Scope Note at 4 (T.D. No. 1, Apr. 8, 2015). 
27 See Restatement of the Law Third Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons § 104 (T.D. No. 1 (Apr. 8, 2015). This section 
was approved by the ALI membership at its annual meeting in May 2015.  [Chris, Ken says you will know how to 
cite this.]  It has since been renumbered as Section 4. See Restatement of the Law Third Torts: Intentional Torts to 
Persons xvii (T.D. No. 2) (Mar. 10, 2017). 
28 See Restatement of the Law Third Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons § 3(b) (T.D. No. 2, Mar. 10, 2017). In May 
2016 the ALI membership voted to limit that provision to situations where the actor has the purpose of causing 
such offense. . [Chris, Ken says you will know how to cite this.]   
29 For a brief discussion of the reporters’ resolution of the single versus dual intent debate, see infra Part I.A.2. 
Other instances in which the reporters have been successful in clarifying existing doctrine include: replacing 
“apprehension” with “anticipation” in the definition of assault to make clear that “fear” is not required, see 
Restatement of the Law Third Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons §105, cmt c (T.D. No. 1, Apr. 8, 2105);confining 
transferred intent to battery, assault, and false imprisonment, leaving any extension to trespass to chattels, 
conversion, and trespass to land to judicial development, see id. at §110, cmt b at 158; and replacing “within 
boundaries fixed by the actor” with “within a limited area” with respect to the required nature of the confinement 
in false imprisonment, to clarify that it is enough if the defendant precludes the plaintiff’s ability to leave a 
confined area even if someone or something else created the limits, see Restatement of the Law Third Torts: 
Intentional Torts to Persons, Reporters’ Memorandum xvii (T.D. No. 2, Mar. 10, 2017). 
30 See, e.g., Restatement of the Law Third Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons § 102, cmt b (T.D. No. 1) (Apr. 8, 2015) 
(extensive discussion of arguments on both sides in single versus dual intent debate); id. at Reporters’ Note to § 
102, cmt b (extensive discussion of Restatement Second’s ambiguous provisions and case law concerning single 
versus dual intent debate). 
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thereby making it easy for courts addressing these questions to decide these issues for themselves. 
Although I disagree with the reporters’ recommended resolution of some of these debates---most 
notably, the decision to adopt single intent rather than dual intent31---I commend the reporters for their 
ability to identify and fully explore a wide range of issues, including providing detailed summaries of the 
conflicting and often confusing case law and laying out the various policy justifications that underlie the 
different positions a court might take.  
Rather than applaud or critique the specific choices the reporters are making as they articulate 
both the elements of each prima facie case and the affirmative defenses that might be asserted, what I 
propose to do in this essay is to discuss two broader concerns I have regarding Intentional Torts. My first 
concern is that the piecemeal nature of assembling the Third Restatement has made the reporters’ task 
more difficult than it should have been and may ultimately contribute to an overall product---the 
assembled projects constituting the Third Restatement of Torts---that is significantly flawed in some 
important respects.32  My second concern draws on Professor Bublick’s fundamental insight that, as a 
conceptual matter, it is important to try to understand what makes intentional torts different than 
either negligence or the strict liability torts.33 Although I agree that this question should not have driven 
the basic organization of the project, I suggest that the reporters may have too often lost sight of this 
distinction, thereby making doctrinal decisions that further blur, rather than clarify the boundaries 
between intentional torts and other torts, primarily negligence.34 
I. The Piecemeal Process of Assembling the Third Restatement of Torts 
Unlike the Second Restatement of Torts (“Second Restatement”), which was conceived as a 
single project,35 the ALI always viewed the Third Restatement as a series of separate projects, each with 
its own reporters. The ALI has completed and published three different segments: Products Liability 
(1998), Apportionment of Liability (2000), and Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (2010). The Third 
Restatement will also include both Intentional Torts and another ongoing project, Liability for Economic 
Harm.36  At the time that the earlier projects were adopted, the ALI did not contemplate restating the law 
of intentional torts.37 As a result, various sections of the earlier, completed projects, most importantly 
                                                          
31 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 2 (defending the dual intent approach). 
32 See infra Part I. 
33 See supra notes 6-12 & accompanying text. 
34 See infra Part II. 
35 See Third Restatement: Products Liability Foreword: 
 The Restatement Second was conceived as a single project, with the brilliant and indefatigable 
William Prosser serving as the sole Reporter. It was eventually completed, after Dean Prosser’s 
resignation, under the reporter-ship of another great torts scholar, John W. Wade. Such a 
comprehensive engagement with the law of torts is no longer feasible. The subject has become 
too broad and too intricate to be encompassed in a single project, even one as prolonged as 
Restatement Second, or by a single directing intelligence, even one as powerful as Bill Prosser’s 
or John Wade’s. 
 
36 An entirely separate project will include sections restating the property torts---trespass to land, trespass to 
chattels, conversion and nuisance---within a broader restatement of the law of property. See Restatement of the 
Law Fourth, Property, Projected Overall Table of Contents, Division One: Property Torts at 
https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/ff/60/ff60711a-c4f4-4e89-b17f-
1b86f1822cba/pages_from_property_pd_2_-_online.pdf. 
37 See supra notes 1-2 & accompanying text. 
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Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, have already addressed certain aspects of intentional tort 
doctrine,38 thereby causing the ALI to take positions that either limit what the current reporters can 
comfortably propose or create unfortunate contradictions and inconsistencies that may undermine the 
clarity and cohesion of the final product. 
In addition, even with respect to a single project, Intentional Torts, portions of the project are 
being reviewed and approved in much smaller chunks than was apparently the case with the Second 
Restatement.39 The result is that the ALI membership is voting to approve certain sections without fully 
understanding the extent to which as yet undrafted sections may impact the decision they are being 
asked to make.40 The risks entailed in this aspect of the piecemeal process of review and adoption 
include not only the presence of unanticipated contradictions and inconsistencies among related 
sections, but also  the possibility that the ALI is now locked into various decisions that it might not have 
made if it had more of the related sections under current consideration. 
A. The Impact of the Already Completed Projects 
Although there are sections of Apportionment of Liability that address some aspects of 
intentional torts,41 it is Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm that has the greatest significance for 
Intentional Torts. Conceptually, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm appears to endorse the view 
that the separation of intentional and nonintentional torts reflects a hierarchy of fault, a view clearly at 
odds with the Simons approach in Intentional Torts.42 More specifically, Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harms assumes the dual intent approach to battery (which Intentional Torts rejects) and 
takes positions that make it difficult for the ALI to consider approving liability for negligent confinement 
or to fully answer the question of when battery, as opposed to negligence, applies in medical treatment 
cases involving patient consent. 
1. Hierarchy of Fault Versus “Apples and Oranges”43 
                                                          
38 See infra Part I.A. 1-2. 
39 For example, the first draft of the Restatement Second that was presented to the ALI Council contained Sections 
1-156, apparently encompassing sections covering the prima facie cases in battery, assault, false imprisonment and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and the privileges of consent, self-defense, defense of others, and 
defense of land or chattels. See ALI Council Meeting Minutes NO. 8017-03 at  p. 5 (Dec. 13-15, 1956). The first draft 
of Intentional Torts presented to the Council contained detailed sections on battery, assault, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress and transferred intent, with no draft of false imprisonment and only brief portions or sketchy 
outlines of the various privileges. Restatement Third Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons (C.D. No. 1). 
40 For example, the first draft of Intentional Torts presented to the membership for its approval consisted of 172 
pages of detailed material on battery, purposeful infliction of bodily harm, assault, intentional infliction of 
emotional harm and transferred intent, followed by six pages containing brief sections and sketchy outlines of the 
various privileges (for discussion only, time permitting). T.D. No. 1 (Apr. 8, 2015). 
41 See Simons, supra note __ at 1064-65 (discussing sections of Apportionment of Liability that provide that: 1) 
intent to cause harm is one of several factors used to apportion responsibility; 2) intentional tortfeasors are jointly 
and severally liable for individual injuries they cause (recognizing, however, that there may be “occasional[]” cases 
of low culpability where joint and several liability should not be applied); and 3) declining to take a position on 
whether comparative fault should ever reduce recovery against an intentional tortfeasor). 
42 See infra Part I.A 
43 Simons, supra note 3 at 1080. 
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Although it does not purport to restate the law of intentional torts,44 Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm maintains the Second Restatement’s traditional, tripartite organization of intentional, 
negligence, and strict liability torts,45 thereby reinforcing the view that this division reflects a hierarchy 
of fault.46 Chapter 1 of Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm defines “intent,” “recklessness,” and 
“negligence,” in that order. Then, after defining “physical harm,” Chapter 2 provides umbrella sections 
on “Liability for Intentional Physical Harm” and “Liability for Negligence Causing Physical Harm.” Chapter 
3 then elaborates aspects of “The Negligence Doctrine and Negligence Liability,” after which Chapter 4 
contains specific provisions for the separate “Strict Liability” torts. Chapters 5 and 6 provide sections on 
“Factual Cause” and “Scope of Liability,” issues that arise with respect to all of the intentional, 
negligence, and strict liability torts.  
Chapter 8 addresses “Liability for Emotional Harm.” Here, too, there is a division of sections that 
appears to reflect a hierarchy of fault. Mirroring the manner in which Chapter Two provides umbrella 
sections for intentional and negligent physical harm, Chapter 8 provides a single section on “Intentional 
or Reckless infliction of Emotional Harm,” followed by sections on “Negligent Conduct Directly Inflicting 
Emotional Harm on Another” and “Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm Resulting from Bodily Harm to 
a Third Person.” 
Aside from the organizational manner in which sections move from intention to recklessness to 
negligence to strict liability, there are other aspects of Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm that 
                                                          
44 See supra notes 1-2 & accompanying text. 
45 Divisions One, Two, and Three of the Second Restatement cover, respectively, “Intentional Harms to Persons, 
Land and Chattels,” “Negligence,” and “Strict Liability.” [R2d TOC] 
46 See, e.g., Alan Calnan, “The Fault(s) in Negligence Law,” 25 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 695, 695-696, 747, (2007) 
(criticizing ALI’s refusal in Third Restatement’s non-intentional harms projects to review earlier restatements’ 
“tripartite structure,” in which “negligence sits at the conceptual midpoint of the liability continuum, separating 
the subjective fault of intentional torts from the no-fault of strict liability,” and arguing against what author 
describes as the “modern paradigm” of tort law’s “continuum of fault”).  For other commentators’ assumption that 
modern tort law’s distinction between intentional and nonintentional torts reflects a hierarchy of fault, see, e.g., 
Prosser and Keaton on Torts  37-38 (5th ed. 1984) ( explaining transferred intent on the ground that “[b]roader 
liability in the case of an intentional invasion of another’s rights illustrates the general attitude of courts to 
imposition of greater responsibility upon an intentional wrongdoer”); Philip Halpern, “Intentional Torts and the 
Restatement,” 7 Buffalo L. Rev. 7, 15 (1957-58) (arguing for a prima facie tort of intentionally causing harm without 
justification on the ground that it should not be necessary to invoke negligence because “[t]he defendant’s wrong 
is much more serious than mere negligence”); Peter Cane, “Justice and Justifications for Tort Liability,” 2 Oxford J. 
legal Stud. 30, 38 (1982) (describing courts’ resistance to treating intentional harms as if they were merely 
negligent, reflecting unwillingness to allow intentional tortfeasors “to get away with being liable only for foreseen 
or foreseeable consequences and wish to impose liability for all causally direct consequences”); Jake Dear and 
Steven E. Zipperstein, “Comparative Fault and Intentional Torts: Doctrinal Barriers and Policy Consideration,” 24 
Santa Clara L. Rev. 1, 2 (1984) (rejecting the concept that intentional conduct is “different in kind” from negligence 
and instead viewing intentional wrongdoing as merely “different in degree” and predicting that the “different 
levels of culpability inherent in each type of conduct will merely be reflected in the jury’s apportionment of fault”); 
Ellen M. Bublick, “The End Game of Tort Reform: Comparative Apportionment and Intentional Torts,” 78 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 355, 400 (2003) (“an intentional tortfeasor is, all other things being equal, more blameworthy than a 
negligent actor”); Richard Epstein, “Intentional Harms,” 4. J. Legal Stud. 391 (1975) (“With the intentional infliction 
of harms, it is not necessary to decide which of two innocent persons should be required to bear the loss in 
question. The element of intention makes the case an easy one, by allowing the loss to be placed upon the person 
who willed it, upon the person who is ‘bad’ in the strongest sense of the word.”). 
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appear to endorse a hierarchy of fault in the division between intentional and nonintentional torts. 
Consider, for example, the following introductory comment to Section 1 on Intent:  
For a variety of reasons, tort law must distinguish between intentional and nonintentional 
consequences and harms (including harms that may be negligent, reckless, or without fault). 
Harms that are tortious if caused intentionally may not be tortious if caused unintentionally; 
affirmative defenses available in negligence cases may not be available when the underlying tort 
is intentional; [and] the limitation period may vary depending on whether the tort is one of 
intent or instead of negligence….47 
Another comment suggests that the beneficial aspects of characterizing conduct as intentional rather 
than negligent are not surprising “given that intentional torts are generally deemed considerably more 
serious than torts of mere negligence.”48 
 A hierarchical fault view is also reflected in Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm’s dual 
definition of intent, an extended scope of liability for intentional torts, and the division between physical 
and emotional harm.49  
Section 1 defines Intent to include both purposefully and knowingly causing harm, and the 
separation of the two into different subsections is designed to permit courts to limit liability to the 
former in some instances, particularly those involving what is elsewhere referred to as “statistical 
knowledge.”50 The comment explains that “[t]here are obvious differences between the actor who acts 
with the desire to cause harm and the actor who engages in conduct knowing that harm is substantially 
certain to follow,” and that “[t]here is a clear element of wrongfulness in conduct whose very purpose is 
to cause harm” that may be lacking in the statistical knowledge cases.51  
Under Section 33, entitled “Scope of Liability for Intentional and Reckless Tortfeasors,”[a]n actor 
who intentionally causes harm is subject to liability for that harm even if it was unlikely to occur.”52 That 
section further provides that “[a]n actor who intentionally or recklessly cause harm is subject to liability 
for a broader range of harms than the harms for which that actor would be liable if only acting 
negligently” and that the moral culpability of the actor “as reflected in the reasons for and intent in 
committing the tortious acts” is one of several factors to consider in determining the scope of liability.53 
By contrast, the section on the scope of liability for negligent conduct makes no provision for 
                                                          
47 Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, §1, cmt a. 
48 Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, §5, cmt a. The quoted language is being used to explain why it is ironic 
that “in certain circumstances the plaintiff is worse off if the tort committed against the plaintiff is classified as 
intentional rather than negligent,” including shorter statutes of limitations and greater difficulty in demonstrating 
that an employee acted within the scope of employment. Id. 
49 After first defining “emotional harm,” Chapter 8 provides a section on the intentional or reckless infliction of 
emotional harm, followed by two sections on the negligent infliction of emotional harm. Id. at §§ 45-48. 
50 The comment refers to cases in which employees attempt to avoid the exclusivity of workers’ compensation by 
characterizing as an intentional tort situations where “the employer has created a very dangerous job-site 
condition that the employer knows will eventually bring about an employee injury.” § 1, cmt a. These cases are 
often referred to as involving “statistical knowledge.” See, e.g., Simons, supra note 3 at 1063 & n. 3. 
51 Liab. For Phys. and Emot. Harm, §1, cmt a. 
52 Id. at §33(a). 
53 Id. at § 33(b). 
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considering of the degree of moral culpability of an actor in determining the scope of harms for which 
the negligent actor will be liable.54 
 The division between physical and emotional harm did not originate from a view that one was 
more serious than the other. Rather, the ALI had initially decided to limit the project to liability for 
physical harm and only subsequently decided to extend that project to include liability for emotional 
harm.55 With respect to the nonintentional torts, the division between physical and emotional harm was 
almost certainly inevitable, as was the decision to begin with physical harm, which was historically the 
focus of the torts of both negligence and strict liability. With respect to intentional torts, however, the 
division in Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm not only reinforces the hierarchy of fault view 
rejected by much of Intentional Torts,56 but also creates confusion concerning the nature of the 
interests being protected by the specific individual torts, which often protect interests other than either 
physical or emotional harm.57 
Section 5 on “Liability for Intentional Physical Harm is “[a]n umbrella rule”58 providing that “[a]n 
actor who intentionally causes physical harm is subject to liability for that harm.”59 The comment states 
that this rule of liability “does not replace the doctrines for specific intentional torts, such as battery, 
assault, false imprisonment, and others,” but rather “provides a framework that encompasses many 
specific torts for intentionally caused physical harm.”60 The comment further provides: 
The general statement of liability in this Section highlights the point that tort law treats the 
intentional infliction of physical harm differently than it treats the intentional causation of 
economic loss or the intentional infliction of emotional harm. In cases involving physical harm, 
proof of intent provides a basic case for liability, although various affirmative defenses may be 
available. However, as the focus shifts from physical harm to other forms of harm, the intent to 
cause harm may be an important but not a sufficient condition for liability. 
 Both the Section 5 text and the quoted commentary are confusing. As Professor Bublick 
previously observed, there is presently no individual tort addressing the intentional infliction of physical 
harm, as such.61 Battery provides liability for the intentional infliction of harmful (or offensive) bodily 
contact, but in the absence of bodily contact, intentionally causing physical harm to either person or 
property will result in liability only in negligence, as a form of the unreasonable creation of the risk of 
physical harm.62 The ALI has approved the reporters’ recommendation that the Third Restatement 
recognize a new intentional tort for physical harm without bodily contact, although unlike the other 
(mostly historical) intentional torts, liability will exist only for purposefully causing such harm, not for 
                                                          
54 Id. at §29. 
55 See supra note 1. 
56 Although rejected by the reporters in the single versus dual intent debate, hierarchy of fault principles appear in 
other parts of the Intentional Torts project. See infra Notes 123-126 & accompanying text. 
57 See infra note 210 & accompanying text.. 
58 §5, cmt a. 
59 §5. 
60 §5, cmt a. 
61 See Bublick, supra note 6 at 1342-44. The Intentional Torts reporters implicitly acknowledge the lack of an 
existing tort of purposeful infliction of physical harm, relying on Restatement Second, Torts § 870’s “prima facie” 
tort as a possible predecessor of the new section. See Intentional Torts, T.D. No. 1 at §104, Reporters’ Note at a.  
62 See, e.g., Restatement Third Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons, § 104, cmt c (T.D. No. 1) 
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merely knowing conduct.63 In this respect, there is ironically less liability for the intentional infliction of 
physical harm (without bodily contact) then there is for the other specific intentional torts such as 
battery, assault, false imprisonment, and even the intentional infliction of emotional distress.64 
 Because Section 5 is limited to the intentional infliction of physical harm, neither that section 
nor its comment addresses the wide range of other interests protected by the historic intentional torts. 
As a result, Section 5 is wildly underinclusive of the common law intentional torts, completely ignoring 
the common law’s traditional protection of such interests as freedom from merely offensive bodily 
contact, freedom from apprehension of either harmful or offensive bodily contacts, and freedom from 
physical confinement.65 Indeed, the Section 5 comment may be affirmatively misleading in its implicit 
suggestion that the intentional torts protect primarily (or perhaps even exclusively) against either 
physical, emotional, or economic harm.66 To the contrary, of the specific torts included in the Intentional 
Torts project, only harmful battery and the intentional infliction of emotional harm fall within that 
grouping, whereas the other intentional torts only incidentally secure the interest in avoiding those 
harms.67 As a result, it is difficult to see how the Intentional Torts project can fit conceptually within the 
overall divisions of tort liability announced in Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm. 
 If Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm had been limited to restating the law of negligence 
and strict liability, then the Intentional Torts reporters would have been free to recommend an entirely 
different approach to describing the relationship between the nonintentional and the intentional torts. 
Here, we would anticipate that Professor Simons would have emphasized what he has previously 
characterized as the “’apples and oranges’”68 approach, whereby the intentional torts function in an 
entirely different manner than the nonintentional torts. According to this approach, “[t]he intentional 
torts protect distinct and sometimes incommensurable interests, and often protect them in different 
ways that a single overarching umbrella tort could not possibly express.”69 Intent sometimes plays a 
necessary but relatively minor role,70 and the hierarchy of fault may be completely irrelevant.71 Indeed, 
                                                          
63 Id. at § 104.  
64 For a discussion of the ALI’s decision to confine the new tort to purposefully causing physical harm, see id. at cmt 
c.  
65 See, e.g., Simons, supra note 3 at 1085 (“[t]he distinct intentional torts protect distinct and sometimes 
incommensurable interests”). 
66 The comment to this section refers only to the intentional infliction of physical, emotional, and economic harm, 
thereby completely ignoring the other interests protected by the intentional torts of offensive battery, assault, and 
false imprisonment. § 5, cmt a (“The general statement of liability in this Section highlights the point that tort law 
treats the intentional infliction of physical harm differently than it treats the intentional causation of economic loss 
or the intentional infliction of emotional harm.”). 
67 See, e.g., Simons, supra note 3 at 1082 (“false imprisonment is a tort that most directly safeguards the interest in 
freedom from physical confinement, and only incidentally secures the more general interest in avoiding physical 
and emotional harm”).  
68 Simons, supra note 3 at 1080.  
69 Id. at 1085. 
70 Under the single intent view of battery, an actor need only intend a bodily contact that the actor deems to be 
neither harmful nor offensive; moreover, the actor may sincerely believe that the victim consented. See Id. at 1081 
(even under dual intent, actor may merely intend to mildly offend, but will be liable if unexpected physical harm 
results). 
71 Id. at 1088. 
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some intentional torts involve no fault whatsoever.72 And if there is a general principle underlying this 
motley collection of specific torts, it is the recognition that they provide an alternative to the 
“reasonableness paradigm,” establishing relatively clear, bright line rules and rejecting any assumption 
that plaintiffs must act reasonably in demanding that their interests be protected against deliberate 
intrusion.73 This general principle is clearly at work throughout much of the commentary in Intentional 
Torts, but nowhere do the reporters note or discuss the extent to which this principle appears to be at 
odds with the overall conceptual vision of Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm. 
 It is difficult to understand how Section 5 was adopted, given that its effort to characterize both 
the nature of the intentional torts and the relationship between intentional and nonintentional torts--- 
even with respect to physical and emotional harm---is so misguided. Unfortunately, because Section 5 
has been both adopted and published, it will likely remain in its present form until a Fourth Restatement 
project is undertaken,74 potentially confusing and confounding judges, practicing lawyers, and scholars 
alike. 
2. Single versus Dual Intent in Battery 
Section 13 of the Second Restatement provides that a defendant has the requisite intent for 
harmful battery if the defendant “acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive [bodily] contact” with 
the plaintiff.75 Recent cases and commentary have surfaced a debate in interpreting this section.76 
Under the single intent view, it is sufficient that the defendant intends to cause a bodily contact; under 
                                                          
72 Id. at 1089 (referring to trespass to land or chattels). Professor Simons also characterizes as a form of strict 
liability the situation where the defendant honestly but mistakenly believes that there are facts that would justify a 
privilege, such as the common law rule that a merchant could not detain a suspected shoplifter, even if the 
mistake was reasonable. Id. at 1081. I would not characterize this as strict liability, given that the merchant 
intentionally confined the shoplifter, which under common law, the merchant had no right to do. As for trespass to 
land, it is true that this is more appropriately characterized as a strict liability tort, because all that is required is an 
intentional entry onto land, and the actor’s reasonable but mistaken belief that the land belongs to the actor is 
irrelevant. [cite to R2d). Elsewhere I have argued that this feature of trespass to land is justified by the origin of the 
tort in providing a method for testing rights of ownership. See Moore, supra note 2 at 1640. The fact that the 
property torts will now be included in a new restatement of property, rather than in the Third Restatement of 
Torts, is support for my view that the property torts are qualitatively different from the torts affecting persons. See 
supra note 36. 
73 See Simons, supra note 3 at 1097-1101. 
74 My understanding is that will there be no effort to amend provisions of Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm 
that conflict with Intentional Torts, and, even further, that there will be no integration of the separate projects into 
a single integrated product, thereby making it difficult for judges, lawyers, and academics to access all of the 
related provisions. See email from Kenneth Simons to Nancy Moore, June 26, 2017 (referring to lack of any current 
plan to integrate the separate tort projects) (email on file with the author). 
75 Second Restatement §13, In fact, intent is defined there to include not only acting with intent to cause a harmful 
or offensive contact, but also acting with intent to cause “an imminent apprehension of such a contact.” This is but 
one aspect of the concept of transferred intent, whereby the intent to commit an assault will be sufficient to 
satisfy the intent requirement in battery, and vice versa. See also Second Restatement §§ 18 (offensive battery), 21 
(assault). Intentional Torts combines harmful and offensive battery into a single section and provides a separate 
section on transferred intent. See § 110 (T.D. No. 1), renumbered as § 10. 
76 See,e.g., Intentional Torts § 102, cmt b & Reporters Note to cmt b. See also, e.g., Moore, supra note 2 at 1597-
1604, 1632-1646; Simons, supra note 3 at 1066-1070. 
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the dual intent view, however, it is also necessary that the defendant intend that the contact cause 
harm or offense.77 
For reasons they explain at length in the comment and the reporter’s notes,78 the reporters 
chose and the ALI membership approved the single intent approach.79 However, Section 5, as well as 
other provisions in Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, almost certainly assume the dual intent 
approach. Take, for example, the text of Section 5: “An actor who intentionally causes physical harm is 
subject to liability for that harm.”80 If physical harm includes harmful bodily contact (and the reporters 
who drafted that section must have thought that it did)81 then it is impossible to reconcile this text with 
the single intent view of battery, in which no intent to cause harm of any kind is required.82 
In addition, the illustrations of harmful battery in Section 1, which defines intent, also reflect the 
dual intent approach. In Illustration 1, for example, a defendant who discharges his gun unaware that 
any person is in the vicinity “has not intentionally caused the harm” when the bullet unexpectedly 
strikes the nearby plaintiff.83  In illustration 2, the defendant throws a rock at the plaintiff, wanting to hit 
him, which she does; she has the requisite intent because she “purposely, and hence intentionally, 
caused this harm.”84 And in Illustration 5, a physician who confuses a dangerous medication with a safe 
medication has not “intentionally harmed” the patient, who is physically harmed by ingesting the 
dangerous medication.85 Given that each of these examples will now be addressed under the single 
intent approach of Intentional Torts, it is both unfortunate and potentially misleading that the 
                                                          
77 See Intentional Torts, §203, cmt b at 49 (T.D. No. 1). 
78 See Intentional Torts § 102, cmt b & Reporters Note to cmt b. 
79 See id. at §102 (“The intent required for battery is the intent to cause a contact with the person of another. The 
actor need not intend to cause harm or offense to the other.”). 
80 See supra note 59 & accompanying text. 
81 See, e.g., Michael D. Green and William C. Powers, Jr. “The Restatement Third of Torts: Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm,” in ALI, A Concise Restatement of Torts 5 (3d ed. 2013) (reporters for Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm describing the project: “It provides rules for liability to intentional, negligence, and strict liability 
torts that result in physical injury.” (Emphasis added.) At time of the drafting and adoption of Section 5, battery 
was the only intentional tort that expressly addressed physical injury to persons. See supra notes 61-64 and 
accompanying text.  
82 Not surprisingly, the intent to cause harm is emphasized throughout the Section 5 comment. 
83 Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, §1, Illustration 1. Of course, there would be no liability here under 
either dual or single intent because the defendant did not intend any bodily contact at all; nevertheless, the 
illustration is noteworthy because the assumption appears to be that what is required is both an intent to contact 
and an intent to harm. 
84 Id. at Illustration 2. Again, there would be liability under either dual or single intent here, but the drafters appear 
to assume that what is required is both intent to contact and intent to harm. 
85 Id. at illustration 5. Here the result with respect to the prima facie case in battery would be different under 
single intent because there was intent to make bodily contact. The Intentional Torts reporters would argue that 
the patient gave actual consent to such contact, and that consent is abrogated only when the actor knows (but the 
victim does not) that the substance ingested will be harmful or offensive. See Intentional Torts § 15(c) (providing 
that actual consent is not “legally effective” when “[t]he person is induced to give consent by a substantial mistake 
concerning the nature of the invasion of the person’s interests or concerning the extent of the expected harm and 
the mistake is known to the actor or is induced by the actor’s affirmative misrepresentation or fraud.”) Although 
the result is the same under either single or dual intent, Illustration 5 clearly presupposes a dual intent view of the 
intent necessary to establish a prima facie case in battery. 
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intentional torts sections of Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm so clearly assume a dual intent 
requirement. 
3. Negligent Confinement 
Section 35 of the Second Restatement, which provides for liability for intentional confinement, 
also provides that “[a]n act which is not done with [intent to confine] does not make the actor liable for 
a merely transitory or otherwise harmless confinement, although the act involves an unreasonable risk 
of imposing it and therefore would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.”86 A 
Caveat further provides that “The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the actor may not be 
subject to liability for conduct which involves an unreasonable risk of causing a conferment of such 
duration or character as to make the other’s loss of freedom a matter of material value.”87 Paralleling 
Section 35, Section 7 of Intentional Torts similarly provides for liability for intentional confinement;88 
however, instead of a formal Caveat, the comment merely states, with respect to the Second 
Restatement’s approach to nonintentional confinement, that “[g]iven the dearth of caselaw on point, 
this Restatement also leaves open the question whether tort liability should exist in the absence of 
either the intent required for wrongful-confinement liability or the bodily harm ordinarily required for 
negligence liability.”89 
A dearth of case law has not prevented the Intentional Torts reporters from proposing to extend 
liability in other instances.90 Moreover, as the Reporters’ Notes explain in detail, there are a fair number 
of cases recognizing liability for negligent confinement resulting in “actual damages” in circumstances 
where the harm suffered was apparently insufficient for liability under traditional negligence 
principles.91 These cases typically involve negligent conduct that results in the plaintiff being confined in 
jail on erroneous charges.92  At least one court clearly stated that “[n]egligent conduct which results in a 
confinement of sufficient consequence to constitute the actual damage required to maintain a 
negligence action is a sufficient basis for imposing liability….Incarceration of even brief duration has 
been found sufficient to fulfill the requirement of actual damage.”93 Surely these cases could have been 
the basis for recommending that the Third Restatement expressly approve liability for conduct falling 
within the Second Restatement’s Caveat. 
                                                          
86 Second Restatement, § 35(2). The bracketed reference is to an earlier section that requires that the actor intend 
to “confine the other or a third person within boundaries fixed by the actor.” Id. at § 35(1)(a).  
87 Id. at § 35 Caveat (emphasis added). 
88 Intentional Torts § 7 (T.D. No. 2). 
89 Id. at § 7, cmt e (also noting that “an actor is subject to negligence liability if the actor engages in conduct that 
creates an unreasonable risk of causing a confinement that results in bodily harm or in other damages of the sort 
that suffice for a negligence claim.” 
90 See, e.g., supra notes 27-28 & accompanying text (recognition of entirely new tort for purposeful infliction of 
emotional harm and extension of offensive battery liability to contacts that do not offend a reasonable sense of 
personal dignity). 
91 Intentional Torts § 7, Reporters’ Note to cmt e. 
92 See id. 
93 Green v. Donroe, 440 A.2d 973, 975-976 (Conn. 1982) (statement is dictum as court concluded that plaintiff 




Why did the Intentional Torts reporters decline to take a position on these cases involving the 
negligent infliction of “a confinement of such duration or character as to make the other’s loss of 
freedom a matter of material value”?94 Perhaps the most obvious answer is that it would have been 
exceedingly difficult to propose a section creating liability for merely negligent conduct in a restatement 
project limited to restating the intentional torts. And perhaps the reporters felt comfortable about this 
decision in the belief that the negligent infliction of a material confinement could be recognized (or 
rejected) as an aspect of the negligent infliction of emotional harm. But wouldn’t it have been useful to 
courts if the Third Restatement, in at least one of its projects, took a clear position on the Second 
Restatement’s Caveat? And does it makes sense conceptually to subsume a harm such as a material 
confinement to the realm of emotional harm, when the interest protected under at least the intentional 
confinement tort is not emotional harm, but rather “[t]he deprivation of the person’s freedom of 
movement, as aspect of a person’s fundamental interest in autonomy or freedom of choice”?95 In any 
event, the issue was apparently not considered by the reporters for Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm, and the emotional harm sections of that project are not necessarily conducive to recognizing 
liability for negligent material confinement. If that project were not already concluded and published, 
then perhaps the Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm reporters would have considered a clearer 
statement on the continuing relevance of the Second Restatement’s Caveat, as well as the possibility of 
approving liability for negligently causing other harms associated with the historic intentional torts. 
4. A Physician’s Mistaken Belief that Patient Consented: 
Is the Potential Liability in Negligence or Battery? 
 
 As Professor Simons has previously observed, it is often difficult to distinguish between battery 
and negligence in medical treatment cases in which a patient alleges that a physician acted without the 
patient’s consent.96 This is the case when a physician mistakenly believes that the patient consented or 
when there is an unintentional deviation from the scope of a patient’s actual consent.97 Under the 
Second  Restatement, any substantial deviation from the scope of a patient’s actual consent is treated 
as a battery,98 although an affirmative defense may be available when the patient’s conduct leads the 
physician to reasonably believe that the patient consents.99 The Intentional Torts reporters have 
endorsed this position,100 except that the draft section on apparent consent does not limit the 
                                                          
94 See supra note 87 & accompanying text (quoting Caveat to Second Restatement §35). 
95 Intentional Torts, § 7,, cmt b (T.D. No. 2 at 27). See also supra note 67 & accompanying text  (Professor Simons’s 
description of interest protected under false imprisonment). 
96 See Simons, supra note ___ at 1071-1076. 
97 See infra notes 216-220 & accompanying text. 
98 See Second Restatement §892A(2) (“In order to be effective, the consent must be to the particular conduct of 
the actor, or to substantially the same conduct.”) The Intentional Torts reporters propose to continue this position 
in the Third Restatement. See infra note 100 & accompanying text. 
99 See Second Restatement § 892 (2) (“If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended 
as consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact.”); id. at 892(a)(2)(a) “in order 
to be effective, consent must be “by one who has the capacity to consent or by a person empowered to consent 
for him.) Not all courts agree that apparent consent must be based on the words or conduct of the plaintiff himself 
or herself. See Intentional Torts §16, Reporters’ Note to cmt c. 
100 See Intentional Torts § 14(a) (“A person’s actual consent does not extend to conduct of the actor that is 
substantially different in nature from the conduct that the person is subjectively willing to permit”). Intentional 
Torts P.D. No. 4. 
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affirmative defense to reasonable belief based on a patient’s actions, but also includes other 
circumstances resulting in such apparent consent.101 
 
I have previously written in support of jurisdictions that take a different approach, under which 
a medical practitioner is not liable for battery unless he or she intentionally deviates from the scope of 
consent given by the patient.102 This would preclude battery liability in two important contexts: first, 
where the physician unintentionally operates on a different body part; and second, where the physician 
mistakenly believes that the patient has given consent for the physician in question to perform a 
particular procedure. It would not preclude any liability; rather, liability would be in negligence when 
physical harm results from a physician’s unreasonable mistake.103 
 
There is much to say about the policy considerations implicated in the choices made by the 
Intentional Torts reporters in this area, and I will address some of these considerations later in this 
essay.104 For now, however, I will limit myself to pointing out that the reporters have been constrained 
in their ability to fully address the distinction between negligence and battery by the failure of Liability 
for Physical and Emotional Harm to address professional malpractice, including the role of custom and 
the typical requirement in medical malpractice negligence cases that the plaintiff establish breach of 
duty through expert testimony on the standard of care.105  
 
The significance of the distinction can be seen by considering an illustration that appears in the 
comments to several section.106 In this illustration, a qualified surgeon asks an equally qualified surgeon 
to perform an operation that the first surgeon is unable perform due to illness.107 The first surgeon’s 
medical notes reveal that the patient had insisted that only the first surgeon perform that operation, but 
the second surgeon did not read those notes.108 Under the reporters’ current draft, if failure to read the 
notes was unreasonable, then there is no apparent consent, and the second surgeon is liable for battery, 
even if the operation is properly performed.109  But how is reasonableness to be determined? Is a jury 
free to decide for itself whether the second surgeon should have read the notes to determine whether 
he or she was permitted to operate? Or would it be bound, as in a negligence case, by uncontradicted 
expert testimony that when surgeons are asked to perform such a substitution, they customarily assume 
                                                          
101 Id. at §16 & cmt c. 
102 See Moore, supra note 2 at Part V. 
103 See id. at 1649 “absent an intentional deviation, the physician’s conduct essentially consists of an inadvertent 
deviation from the standard of conduct required of physicians and therefore should be addressed in a negligence 
action”). 
104 See infra notes 216-220  & accompanying text. 
105 See email from Ken Simons to Nancy J. Moore, Feb. 20, 2017 (“One tricky problem of drafting is that R3 of torts 
has not covered professional malpractice, so there are limits to how detailed we can be in this restatement in 
describing the negligent causation of physical harm doctrine.”) 
106 The illustration first appears in the comment to the section on the scope of actual consent. See Intentional Torts 
§ 14, Illustration 4. It is then referenced in the comment to the section on apparent consent. See id. at § 16, cmt. d. 
107 Intentional Torts, §14, Illustration 4. 
108 Id. 
109 Battery, like most other intentional torts, does not require any harm, and the plaintiff is always entitled to at 
least nominal damages. In addition, the patient would be entitled to recover damages for any bad side-effects, 
even if the surgery is performed properly. See email from ken Simons to Nancy J. Moore, Feb. 20, 2017. 
15 
 
the patient’s consent to the substitution.110 In the absence of Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm 
addressing the use of expert testimony in medical malpractice cases, it is obviously difficult for the 
Intentional Torts reporters to answer this question, even though it has important ramifications for 
liability for battery, as well as for negligence. 
 
B  The Impact of Piecemeal Review and Approval of  
Related Sections of Intentional Torts 
 
The process of producing a restatement is as follows:111 The reporters draft individual sections; 
those sections are then reviewed by project Advisers, who are members who have been selected to serve 
in that advisory role, and by the Members Consultative Group, which consists of all members who request 
to serve in that capacity. Based on these discussions, the reporters make selected revisions and either 
bring the sections back to these two groups the following year or submit them to the ALI Council. The 
reporters then make any revisions suggested or directed by the Council, at which point the drafts may be 
revised and either brought back to the Advisers and Members Consultative Group for further discussion 
or submitted to the ALI membership for discussion only or for discussion and approval. When sections are 
submitted for its approval, the ALI membership discusses each section and then votes it up or down, along 
with any amendments submitted by individual members. If the vote on a section was close, the reporters 
may bring it back to the membership, with or without revisions. And based on the discussion, the reporters 
may agree at the meeting to make minor revisions to individual sections, typically to the comments. When 
all of the proposed sections of a project have been approved by the membership, the reporters submit a 
Proposed Final Draft that consists of all prior approved drafts, and this draft is then submitted to the 
Council and the membership. Although it is possible for minor revisions at this late stage of the process, 
it is highly unlikely that there will be any substantial amendments to either the text or the comments. 
 
The Intentional Torts project began in 2013. In the spring of 2014, sections on battery, purposeful 
infliction of bodily harm, assault, intentional (or reckless) infliction of emotional harm and transferred 
intent were submitted to the membership for discussion only.112 The draft of these sections was revised 
and brought back to the ALI membership in the spring of 2015,113 at which time they were approved. The 
vote on one section was close, and the reporters revised and submitted it once again at the spring 2017 
meeting.114 The sections on false imprisonment were also submitted for approval, but time constraints 
prevented their consideration at that meeting. Detailed sections on consent were not submitted to the 
                                                          
110 See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts §242 (2000) (professionals bound not by reasonable person standard 
but by professional customs and standards in the relevant community). 
111 See generally ALI, “How the Institute Works,” at https://www.ali.org/about-ali/how-institute-works/. 
112 Intentional Torts, Discussion Draft (Apr. 4, 2014). The document contained no draft of false imprisonment and 
only tentative and preliminary sections on consent, as well as a very brief mention of privileges other than consent. 
113 Intentional Torts, T.D. No. 1.(Apr. 8, 2015). Certain black-letter provisions and comments referenced consent 
were submitted for discussion only. Those provisions were directed primarily to the question of which party bears 
the burden of production and proof on consent. 
114 See Intentional Torts, T.D. No. 2  xix-xx (Reporters’ Memorandum addressing § 103(b), now renumbered as § 
3(b), on liability for offensive contacts that do not offend a reasonable sense of dignity). The Reporters redrafted 




advisory groups until March 2017, along with tentative provisions on privileges such as defense of land or 
personal property.115 
 
As this brief overview of the review process reveals, neither the advisory groups nor the ALI 
membership has had an opportunity to engage in a detailed review of all of the relevant project sections 
at the time they are asked to comment on or approve individual sections. As a result, it may not be 
apparent at the time individual sections are being reviewed what the impact might be of later, as-yet-
undrafted sections. The risks of this piecemeal process of consideration are that: 1) the ALI takes a position 
on an issue that it might not have taken if it had fully understood the imspact of later sections; and 2) the 
ALL adopts provisions that contain unanticipated contradictions or inconsistencies among related 
sections, which could diminish the coherency of the project as a whole. To illustrate the former, I suggest 
that the decision to adopt single rather than dual intent might have been different if the ALI had fully 
understood the extent to which subsequent provisions undermine some of the arguments in favor of the 
single intent approach. To illustrate the latter, I suggest that the positions being taken on intentional tort 
liability for omissions, rather than actions, are inconsistent and reflect the lack of a clear, consistent and 
coherent vision of the difference between the intentional torts and the tort of negligence. 
 
1. Single Versus Dual Intent: Revisited 
Under the single intent view, a battery is committed if an actor intends to cause a bodily contact 
and that contact is either harmful or offensive, whereas under the dual intent view, the actor must 
intend both the bodily contact and that the contact be harmful or offensive.116 One of the arguments in 
favor of dual intent is that intentional tort liability should be reserved for actors who are generally more 
culpable than merely negligent actors.117 An actor who intends to harm or offend is more culpable than 
an actor who has no such intent. Indeed, an actor who intends a bodily contact without either desiring 
or knowing that such contact will harm or offend is barely culpable, given that intent is subjective, unlike 
negligence, where actors are held to the standard of the objective, reasonable person in similar 
circumstances.118 
As the reporters recognize, the circumstance that presents the greatest test for the single intent 
view is when an intended contact that is neither offensive nor likely to result in bodily harm  
unexpectedly results in serious bodily injury.119 Given the extremely low risk of such harm, the actor 
would not be liable in negligence,120 but because she intended a bodily contact, she may now be liable 
for the intentional tort of battery, with potentially substantial damage, as well as the practical effects of 
characterizing a tort as intentional, including an extended scope of liability and the inability to raise a 
comparative negligence defense.121 The reporters defend this result by noting that “insofar as the single-
                                                          
115 See Intentional Torts Preliminary Draft No. 4 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
116 See supra Note 75 & accompanying text. 
117 See, e.g., Intentional Torts, §102 cmt b at 50 (T.D. No. 1); Moore, supra note 2 at 1632. 
118 The reporters describe the single-intent approach as “imposing a modest degree of strict liability.” Intentional 
Torts §102 cmt b at 50 (T.D. No. 1).  
119 Id. at 57-58. 
120 Id.at 58. 
121 See infra note 196 & accompanying text. 
17 
 
intent rule is meant to afford very strong protection to a person’s right of bodily autonomy, liability even 
in this class of cases is justifiable.”122 
This response is, of course, a rejection of the hierarchy of fault principle in favor of the “apples 
and oranges” approach. But what may not have been fully apparent when this section was being 
considered was the extent to which the reporters draw on hierarchy of fault principles elsewhere in 
Intentional Torts.  A prominent example is in Section 7, the basic provision on false imprisonment. 
Section 7 generally requires that the plaintiff be aware that he or she is being confined, but does not 
require such awareness if the plaintiff “suffers bodily harm as a result of the confinement.”123 In 
Comment h, the reporters recognize that when the plaintiff suffers bodily harm, liability under false 
imprisonment might not be necessary “because negligence liability is arguably a satisfactory 
alternative.”124 They nevertheless justify the provision on the ground that “intentional-tort liability, 
rather than negligence liability, is proper in such cases because an actor who intentionally confines 
another and thus causes bodily harm is typically more culpable than an actor who merely negligently 
causes bodily harm.”125 More specifically, the reporters conclude that “by classifying conduct as an 
intentional tort, a jurisdiction may wish to trigger certain doctrinal consequences, such as ignoring the 
plaintiff’s own fault or expanding the scope of liability” and that “[f]alse imprisonment, like battery and 
assault, is an intentional tort for which such consequences are ordinarily appropriate.”126 
Another argument in favor of single intent is that it better explains the result in medical 
treatment cases where a physician mistakenly believes that the patient has consented to the treatment. 
Courts routinely find the intent element satisfied in such cases, and the reporters argue that dual intent 
does not adequately explain such cases because the physician intends to benefit rather than harm the 
patient, and if the physician believes the patient has consented, then the physician does not intend to 
offend. 127  Dual intent proponents, such as myself, argue in response that most medical treatment cases 
do involve an intent to harm because the physician (typically a surgeon) understands that surgical 
treatment necessarily requires bodily harm, even if the ultimate result is intended to be beneficial.128 In 
the alternative, we argue that courts should analyze the prima facie element of intent separately from 
the privilege of apparent consent. In doing so, they should find that the treating physician understands 
that surgery and other invasive treatments without the patient’s consent will constitute an offensive 
contact. They can then separately address whether the physician is nevertheless privileged to act 
because he or she reasonably believes that the patient consents to the treatment.129 The reporters’ 
                                                          
122 Id. 
123 Intentional Torts § 7(c). 
124 Id. at § 7, cmt h, at 34. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. Section 7 was not before the ALI membership in the spring of 2015 when it approved the reporters’ 
recommendation to endorse single rather than dual intent; however, Section 104---creating an entirely new tort 
for the purposeful infliction of physical harm (absent bodily contact) was approved by the membership at that 
time. See Intentional Torts §§102, 110 (T.D. No. 1, Apr. 8, 2015). The comment to Section 104 also invoked 
hierarchy of fault reasoning to justify creating a new intentional tort rather than relying on the negligence action to 
cover such harm. See id. at §104, cmt. c. Arguably this comment should have alerted the membership to the 
inconsistency in rejecting hierarchy of fault principles in order to endorse single over dual intent, although it may 
have been unclear to what extent other parts of the Intentional Torts project would rely on such principles. 
127 See Intentional Torts, §102 cmt b at 53-54 (T.D. No. 1); see also Simons, supra note 2 at 1067-1070.. 
128 See Moore, supra note ___, at 1619-1620. 
129 Id. at 1620, n. 209. 
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response to this argument is to reject it as being what they elsewhere refer to as “counterfactual.”130 
Thus they argue that “this conditional conception of intent seems artificial. If such an actor actually 
believes (even unreasonably) that the other consents to a particular contact, then it seems a fiction to 
say that the actor nevertheless actually knows or believes that the other will be offended by the 
contact.”131 
Having rejected “counterfactual” intent for purposes of choosing single over dual intent, the 
reporters nevertheless subsequently endorsed a similar concept of “counterfactual consent” in a newly 
crafted privilege entitled “Implied-in-Law Consent.”132 Section 17 provides that an actor is privileged to 
engage in what would otherwise be tortious intentional conduct if “most individuals…in the person’s 
circumstances would actually consent to the actor’s conduct” and, in addition, the invasion is “de 
minimis” or “the actor reasonably believes that his or her conduct is necessary to further public policies 
or private interests that substantially outweigh the gravity of the invasion.”133 The reporters explain that 
this section requires that most persons would consent to such a contact because “[t]his feature helps 
assure that §17(a) rests on a consensual rationale, albeit a counterfactual one.”134 They go on to note 
that “[c]ourts regularly employ an analogous counterfactual rationale” in other contexts, such as 
“determining the contours of a medical practitioner’s duty to obtain informed consent.”135 The embrace 
of “counterfactual” consent in this context is clearly at odds with its rejection in the context of dual 
intent in medical treatment cases.136 
If Section 17 had been drafted and reviewed at the same time as the initial battery sections, the 
advisory groups might also have considered another implication of the decision to choose single over 
dual intent. Section 17 has no counterpart in the Second Restatement, nor is anything like it clearly 
articulated in case law.137 Nevertheless, the reporters deemed the new “implied-in-law” privilege 
necessary to preclude intentional-tort liability in a small number of cases involving “socially justifiable 
minor contacts, such as pushing against pedestrians or bus or subway passengers in crowded conditions, 
or requiring people evacuating a building during a fire alarm to move with such haste that they must 
touch other while exiting.”138 Such a provision would not have been necessary if the reporters had 
endorsed dual intent, because in situations involving “justifiable minor contacts,” the actor typically 
does not intend to either harm or offend.139 At the time the single-versus-dual intent was before them, 
                                                          
130 See infra notes 132-36 & accompanying text. 
131 Section 102, Reporter’s Note at 67. 
132 Intentional Torts §17 (Prelim. Draft No. 4 (Mar. 6, 2017). The existence of such a privilege was noted in earlier 
drafts, see, e.g., infra note 141 & accompanying text), but this is the first draft to provide a detailed account of how 
the privilege is established. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at cmt b, p. 150 (emphasis added). 
135 Id. 
136 The reporters and I agree that there is case law supporting both single and dual intent debate. Thus the primary 
basis for resolving the dispute should be a combination of policy rationales and determining which approach best 
coheres with the rest of tort law. I will not explain here why I believe dual intent better satisfies both of these 
concerns, but will leave that for another time. 
137 See Intentional Torts § 17, cmt a 
138 Id. at cmt b. 
139 Exception where plaintiff has expressly refused consent, as when he or she shouts “Keep your distance! Do not 
touch me” when standing in a crowded bus. Under the Second Restatement, the actor would not have intended 
offense even then, because “offense” was defined as offending a “reasonable sense of personal dignity” and did 
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the advisory groups were informed that such cases would be addressed by an implied-in-law privilege; 
however, they were not informed that this was an entirely new privilege140 nor were they confronted 
with the difficulties created in interpreting and applying the actual requirements of such a privilege.141 
For example, what constitutes a “de minimus” invasion of the plaintiff’s interests? And when does an 
actor “reasonably believe that his or her conduct is necessary to further public policies or private 
interests that substantially outweigh the gravity of the invasion”? Are these questions for the court or 
for juries to decide?142 Such vague standards seem antithetical to the use of bright-line rules that 
typically distinguish the intentional torts from negligence,143 and it is questionable whether the ALI 
would have approved the adoption of this section when there would be no need for it if the dual intent 
standard had been adopted. 
Finally, neither the advisory groups nor the ALI membership were clearly confronted with the 
possible use of comparative negligence in at least some battery cases. Historically, neither contributory 
nor comparative negligence was a recognized defense to an intentional tort. The Apportionment of 
Liability project did not take a position on the use of comparative negligence in intentional torts cases, 
although it did suggest that, unlike the “image of a mugger who claims that the victim was negligent for 
being out too late at night or for wearing too much jewelry,” it might be justified to permit a 
comparative negligence defense when “a defendant who otherwise batters a plaintiff honestly but 
unreasonably believes the conduct was privileged or that it was not harmful or offensive.”144 
At the time of the single-versus-dual intent debate, the possibility of such a limited use of the 
comparative negligence defense was briefly mentioned in the Reporter’s Scope Note, but it appeared 
only  at the end of a lengthy discussion of whether negligence and intentional-tort claims are mutually 
exclusive.145 The possible use of a comparative negligence defense does not reappear in the discussion 
of single versus dual intent,146 and it is unlikely that the implications of a section on a defense of 
comparative negligence were considered in the debate over the issue. The reporters have not drafted a 
                                                          
not include such ultrasensitive feelings. The ALI membership recently approved a new provision of the Third 
Restatement that defines “offense” to include ultrasensitive plaintiffs, if the actor made the contact with the very 
purpose of causing offense, thereby incorporating an element of dual intent in battery. It is unclear whether an 
actor who purposefully offends an ultrasensitive plaintiff can take advantage of the “implied-in-law” consent 
provision.  
140 See supra note 141 & accompanying text. 
141 See, e.g., Intentional Torts T.D. No. 1 at 176 (Section 117, entitled “Implied-in-Law Consent [or ‘Constructive’ 
Consent] described as follows: “[This category includes socially justifiable contacts, such as pushing against 
pedestrians or bus or subway passengers in crowded conditions, or requiring people evacuating a building during a 
fire alarm to move with such haste that they touch each other while existing.’”) 
142 Juries routinely determine the reasonableness of an actor’s conduct in negligence cases and in assessing such 
privileges as self-defense and defense of property; however, in neither of these instances are juries asked to assess 
when conduct is justified as a matter of public policy or to determine when an actor’s private (undefined) interests 
are substantially outweighed by the gravity of invasions of personal dignity. Cf. Intentional Torts §3 T.D. No. 2 
(liability for contact that offends a plaintiff with an unusually sensitive sense of personal dignity will not be 
imposed if the court determines that imposing liability would be unduly burdensome or violate public policy).  
143 See infra notes 213-15  & accompanying text. 
144 Restatement Third of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, §1, cmt. c,  Reporter’s Note at 13 (1999).. 
145 See Intentional Torts Scope Note too Persons Project at 6 (T.D. No. 1). 
146 See id. at §102, cmt. b. 
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section on comparative negligence,147 although they are contemplating doing so.148 Given the low 
culpability of a single intent actor,149 the adoption of such a provision may be compelling, but the 
difficulties entailed in its adoption have yet to be considered. These difficulties—primarily how to 
determine when a victim’s fault should be taken into account150---would be significantly lessened under 
a dual intent requirement, as there would be less of a perceived need to ameliorate the potentially 
harsh consequences for an actor who intends to harm or offend. 
2. Liability for Omissions 
 Sections 1 and 5 provide that for the intentional torts of battery and assault, an actor must 
engage in “affirmative conduct.”151 Section 7, however, provides that for the intentional tort of false 
imprisonment, an actor must either engage in “affirmative conduct” or ”breach[] a duty to release the 
other from such a confinement.”152 Section 10 provides that “[a]n actor who purposefully or knowingly 
instigates, or participates substantially in, the commission of an intentional tort of battery,…assault…or 
false imprisonment is subject to liability for that tort, even if the actor’s personal conduct is not 
independently tortious.”153 Comment b to Section 10 addresses omissions, stating that “[i]n addition to 
affirmative acts, nonfeasance may also constitute participation, where the defendant had a duty to 
warn, protect, or rescue the plaintiff.”154 
 Comment c to Section 1 explains the requirement of an affirmative act for liability in both 
assault and battery. After conceding that it is possible to “imagine cases in which battery or assault 
liability for an omission to rescue or protect another seems defensible”---as when a prison guard out of 
hostility toward one inmate deliberately fails to intervene to prevent that inmate from being severely 
beaten by another inmate---the comment nevertheless rejects such liability on the grounds that “judicial 
support for such liability is sparse” and that “allowing battery or assault liability for an omission 
whenever a person has  duty to act and has the requisite intent for the tort would raise concerns about 
unduly broad liability.”155 The comment acknowledges that the draft section on false imprisonment 
subjects an actor to liability if the “actor intentionally breaches a duty to rescue a person from 
confinement,” but provides no explanation for recognizing omissions liability in the case of false 
                                                          
147 Indeed, none of the drafts signal an intention to draft such a provision. The most recent draft considered by the 
advisory groups sets forth detailed consent provisions and indicates several other “privileges” to be drafted, such 
as defense of land or personal property. See Prelim. Draft No. 4. Comparative negligence would operate as an 
affirmative defense that would reduce but not necessarily eliminate the plaintiff’s recovery, unlike the privileges, 
which if satisfied, defeat the plaintiff’s claim. 
148 See email from Jonathan Cardi to Nancy J. Moore dated Apr. 11, 2017 (on file with author).. 
149 See supra note 75 & accompanying text. 
150 See generally, e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, The End Game of Tort Reform: Comparative Apportionment and Intentional 
Torts, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 355 (2003); Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All-or-Nothing 
Lottery Imposed in Intentional Torts Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant Are at Fault, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 121 
(1993); Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 46; William J. McNichols, Should Comparative Responsibility Ever Apply to 
Intentional Torts, a37 Okla. L. Rev. 641 (1984). 
151 Intentional Torts § 1(b) (battery); § 5(b) T.D. No. 2, Appendix C 
152 Intentional torts § 7(b) T.D. No. 2. 
153 Intentional Torts § 10 Prelim. Draft No. 4. (This section has not been approved by the Council for presentation 
to the membership; therefore, it may be substantially revised before it is presented for adoption.) 
154 Id. at cmt b. 
155 Intentional Torts T.D. No. 1 § 101 cmt c. 
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imprisonment but not battery or assault.156 Moreover, the comment makes no mention of the 
presumably-not-yet-drafted Section 10,157 including the fact that under that section an actor can be 
found liable for participation in a battery or assault based on nonfeasance as well as misfeasance, even 
though the actor could not be found liable under Section 1, because of the lack of an affirmative act.158 
 Sparse case law support has not proved to be a consistent obstacle to recognizing liability 
elsewhere in Intentional Torts. Most prominently, despite the lack of significant case law support, the 
ALI is recognizing an entirely new intentional tort for purposeful infliction of bodily harm (absent bodily 
contact)159 and is extending liability for offensive battery to include some bodily contacts that would not 
offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity.160 Thus, further explanation is required for the failure to 
harmonize the battery and assault treatment of omissions with the treatment of omissions liability 
under false imprisonment and participation. 
 As noted above, the alternative explanation is a concern for “unduly broad liability,” a concern 
rejected with respect to other liability-expanding provisions, including the recognition of single intent.161 
Moreover, in rejecting omissions liability for battery and assault, the reporters rely on yet another 
justification that they elsewhere reject---that “liability for negligence or for intentional infliction of 
emotional harm is ordinarily adequate to address instances in which an actor’s omission reflects 
sufficient fault to warrant tort liability.”162  
 The reporters could easily have reached the same conclusion in considering omissions liability 
for both false imprisonment and participation. Liability in negligence typically requires physical harm, 
thus limiting the scope of an actor’s liability; however, this limitation could have been justified as 
necessary to avoid precisely the “unduly broad liability” that was a primary reason for rejecting 
omissions liability in battery and assault.163 Moreover, liability in negligence is also limited by the 
requirement that for omissions liability, the actor must be subject to an affirmative duty to act, which 
exists primarily as a result of voluntary undertakings, special relationships, and situations where the 
actor’s affirmative conduct created the risk to the plaintiff.164 Indeed, this is precisely what the reporters 
recommend for omissions liability in false imprisonment, where the duty to act affirmatively is to be 
                                                          
156 See id. See also id. at Reporters’ Note to cmt c (providing extensive discussion of cases without any effort to 
explain why omissions are sufficient for liability in false imprisonment but not battery). 
157 Section 10 first appeared in Preliminary Draft No. 4, dated March 6, 2017. 
158 See supra note 151 & accompanying text. 
159 See supra note 27 & accompanying text. 
160 See supra note 28 & accompanying text. 
161 As the reporters explain, in most instances the result will not differ depending on whether single or dual intent 
is adopted; however, they acknowledge that single intent broadens liability in some cases involving young children 
and adults with mental disabilities, as well as situations involving nonconsensual contacts that cause bodily harm 
but not offense. See T.D. No. 1 at 56-58. The reporters and I disagree on the impact of the debate on such cases as 
medical batteries and practical jokes and horseplay . Compare id. at 53-55 with Moore, supra note 2, at 1619-1626. 
162 TD 1 at 18. The reporters reject the adequacy of an action in negligence in their discussion of the need to 
recognize a new intentional tort of purposeful infliction of bodily harm rather than rely on liability in negligence. 
See supra note 126. 
163 See supra note 161 & accompanying text. 
164 See Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, Ch. 11 (Affirmative Duties). 
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found not in Intentional Torts, but rather in other sources of law, including case law recognizing such a 
duty in negligence law.165 
 The reporters might respond that they were simply following similar positions taken by the ALI 
in the Second Restatement. Aside from the fact that the reporters have rejected Second Restatement 
provisions in other instances,166 it is noteworthy that the Intentional Torts sections on false 
imprisonment and participation do not simply mirror equivalent positions in the Second Restatement 
but rather expand an actor’s liability for omissions in ways that more closely resemble liability for 
negligence rather than liability for an intentional tort.  
  Consider, for example, Section 45 of the Second Restatement, which provides with respect to 
false imprisonment that “[i]f an actor is under a duty to release the other from confinement, or to aid in 
such release by providing a means of escape, his refusal to do so with the intention of confining the 
other is a sufficient act of confinement to make him subject to liability.”167 Section 7 of Intentional Torts 
differs from Section 45 in several important respects. First, it does not expressly limit the actor’s liability 
to a “refusal” to release, but rather provides for liability whenever an actor “breaches a duty” to release 
with the requisite intent.168 Second, unlike Section 45, which takes no position on when a duty to 
release a person from confinement will be found,169 Comment f to Section 7 provides that such a duty 
can be found in “general tort-law principles” and that the sections providing for omissions liability in 
negligence presumptively apply, 170  thereby creating a “duty to take reasonable steps to release a 
person from confinement” whenever negligence law recognizes a duty “to use reasonable care to 
protect a person from physical injury.”171 
                                                          
165 See, e.g. T.D. No 2 at §7, cmt f (false imprisonment); The reporters do not discuss the legal source of a duty to 
“warn, protect, or rescue the plaintiff” as the basis for participation liability, see P.D. NO. 4 at §10, cmt b; however, 
presumably they mean to refer to the same sources of a legal duty as in false imprisonment..  
166 For example, with respect to false imprisonment by submission to an assertion of legal authority, the reporters 
recommend a change to the Second Restatement’s requirement that the plaintiff either believe that the authority 
is valid “or is in doubt as to its validity,” whereby it will now be sufficient if “the plaintiff submits to custody 
because the other believers that he or she might have a duty to comply with the assertion of authority or might 
face adverse legal consequences for failure to comply.” P.D. No. 4 at §9, Reporters’ Note to cmt a (emphasis 
added). 
167 Restatement Second §45 (emphasis added). 
168 Intentional Torts, T.D. No. 2, § 7. The reporters acknowledge that some courts limit omission liability to a refusal 
or knowing failure to perform the legal duty to release. See id. at 51. TD #1 at 51 (discussing “Colorado’s narrower 
duty to release from confinement than this Section recognizes”). The reporters suggest that there is actually no 
substantial difference between the two positions, citing a Pennsylvania jury instruction; however, that 
Pennsylvania instruction limits liability to one who “’refuses to do what is reasonable under the circumstances to 
do.’” Id. at 47 (emphasis added). Section 7 is not so limited. Professor Simons concedes that Section 45 imposes 
liability when the defendant merely negligently breaches a duty to release. See email from Kenneth Simons to 
Nancy J. Moore dated.June 25, 2016 (on file with author). 
169 See Intentional Torts, T.D. No. 2 at §7, Reporters’ Note to cmt f (stating that contrary to Section 45, where 
Comment b provided that “[it] is not within the scope of this Restatement to state when the duty to aid another in 
relase from confinement may arise,” Section 7 “offers greater guidance by presuming that the affirmative duties 
specified in [Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm” apply). 
170 Intentional Torts, P.D. No. 4 at § 7, cmt f (including a caveat that such a presumption is  “subject to appropriate 
modifications in light of the difference in context between an affirmative duty to protect a person from the risk of 
physical harm and an affirmative duty to release a person from confinement”). 
171 Id.  
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 It is one thing to recognize intentional tort liability for a deliberate, purposeful refusal to release 
a person from confinement. It is quite another to recognize intentional tort liability for an actor who, 
knowing that failure to release will result in continuing confinement,172 fails to take reasonable steps to 
effectuate the plaintiff’s release. Consider, for example, a case discussed in the Reporter’s Note to a 
comment comparing false imprisonment and negligence liability.173 A passenger confined in an airplane 
during a severe storm sued for false imprisonment, alleging that the confinement was the result of a 
lack of adequate ground staff. The court dismissed the claim, citing the lack of evidence of a purpose to 
confine or even knowledge that confinement was substantially certain to follow. Here the plaintiff was 
alleging a failure to take adequate precautions to prevent the confinement in the first place, which is a 
classic instance of merely negligent imprisonment. But what if the evidence supported a failure to take 
reasonable precautions after it was clear that the passengers were confined in the aircraft as a result of 
the snowstorm? Perhaps the defendants could have called in extra workers or used some equipment 
that they didn’t think to use. Under Section 7, it would appear that the defendants could now be held 
liable for false imprisonment for failure to take reasonable steps to release the passengers from 
confinement; that is, for breaching a duty established under negligence law to require reasonable care 
to avoid physical harm, but now being used to establish intentional tort liability regardless of the low 
probability of physical harm as a result of the temporary confinement. The reporters provide no 
justification for the differing results under false imprisonment depending on the timing of when the 
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid the confinement.174 
 As for Section 10 on instigation and participation, the reporters state that “[t]his Section 
replaces Restatement Second, Torts § 45A and §§ 876 and 877(a) and (c), insofar as they apply to 
battery, purposeful infliction of harm, assault, intentional infliction of emotional harm, and false 
imprisonment.”175 Section 45A provides that “[o]ne who instigates or participates in the unlawful 
                                                          
172 The reporters state that the difference between the narrower “refusal” and the broader provision in Section 7 is 
“often unimportant because an omitting actor often will lack the intention to confine the other.” Id. at Reporters’ 
Note to § 7, cmt. f (47). However, such intention will be present whenever the actor knows with substantial 
certainty that a confinement of which the actor is aware will continue unless the actor is able to release the 
plaintiff. See Restatement Third: Liability for Phys. and Emot. Harm § 1. The cases with which I am concerned 
involve a defendant who attempts unsuccessfully to release a plaintiff and who might be deemed negligent in 
making that attempt. See infra note2 173-74 & accompanying text. 
173 See Vumbaca v. Terminal One Group Ass’n L.P., 859 F. Supp.2d 343 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), discussed in T.D. No. 2, 
Reporters Note to § 7, cmt. e, p. 46. 
174 In an email exchange with Professor Simons, I raised this precise point. He responded, first that he believed “sec 
45 probably did mean to impose liability when D merely negligently breaches a duty to release, while knowing that 
P is confined,” citing comment b, which states that “’[t]he actor is not required to do more than is reasonable 
under the circumstances,’” although he conceded that one illustration was unclear and the others involved “a 
stronger form of ‘refusal’.”  See email from Kenneth Simons to Nancy Moore dated Jun. 25, 2016 (on file with 
author). He also noted that “the case law is pretty clear that [liability] attaches when a court notifies prison 
officials to release P but due to negligence, the officials do not communicate the order to the relevant persons and 
secure P’s release.” Id. In my opinion, cases involving negligence on the part of prison officials to release a prisoner 
are not relevant because they involve the termination of a privilege to intentionally confine, not a failure to release 
absent an initial intent to confine. As for comment b to Section 45 of the Second Restatement, in my view there is 
a substantial difference between a refusal to do what is reasonable under the circumstances (which is what I 
believe the comment references) and negligently carrying out an effort to release, which is within the scope of 
Section 7. In any event, even if there is some authority for the reporters’ position, this authority alone does not 
explain why there is a difference in result depending on the timing of the actor’s negligence.  
175 Intentional Torts, P.D. No. 4 at § 10, cmt a. 
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confinement of another is subject to liability to the other for false imprisonment.”176 Neither the text 
nor the comment makes any reference to omissions liability. Indeed, “instigation” is defined as “words 
or acts which direct, request, invite or encourage the false imprisonment itself,”177 and “participation” is 
defined to include “[o]ne who takes part in a false imprisonment, by aiding another to make it.”178 None 
of the illustrations involves an omission as the basis for liability under this section.179 Section 876 
concerns “Persons Acting in Concert.”180 Liability under this section requires either; (a) the doing of “a 
tortious act in concert with [another]  or pursuant to a common design with [the other];  (b) giving 
“substantial assistance or encouragement to [another}”, knowing “that the other’s conduct constitutes a 
breach of duty”;  or (c) giving “substantial assistance to [an]other in accomplishing a tortious result” 
when “his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.”181 
Once again, nothing in the comment or the illustration suggests liability for mere omissions under this 
section.182 Finally, Sections 877(a) and (c) provide for liability for one who “orders or induces the 
[tortious] conduct of another if he knows or should know of circumstances that would make the conduct 
tortious if it were his own”183 or “permits the other to act upon his premises or with his 
instrumentalities, knowing or having reason to know that the other is acting or will act tortuously.”184 
Possibly the language of section (c) could be construed to include passively granting “permission”; 
however, that section is limited to a narrow set of circumstances and, even then, is apparently intended 
to apply to negligence actions, not intentional torts.185 Nothing in the comment suggests the breadth of 
participation liability the reporters are proposing under Section 10 of Intentional Torts.186 
 The Comment to Section 10 provides two illustrations of its proposed liability for omissions. In 
the first, a police officer who merely “stands by as her partner…performs an illegal strip search” is liable 
for participation,187 However, the cases on which that illustration is “loosely based”188 actually consisted 
of more than a mere failure to intervene.189 In the second illustration, a supervisor who witnesses and 
                                                          
176 Second Restatement, § 45A (“Instigating or Participating in False Imprisonment”). 
177 Id. at cmt c.  
178 Id. at cmt e. 
179 See id. at cmt c, Illustrations 1-3. 
180 Second Restatement § 876. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Second Restatement § 877(a). 
184 Id. at § 877 (c). 
185 Id. at Comment (b) {“The rules stated in Clauses (b),(c) and (d) are subject to the general rules of negligence and 
of causation. The liability stated exists only if the resulting harm is within the risk created by the defendant’s 
negligent conduct in acting or in failing to control.” 
186 Id. 
187 Intentional Torts, P.D. No. 4 at § 10, cmt b, Illustration 5. 
188 Id. at Reporters’ Note to cmt b. 
189 The two cases cited as support for this illustration are Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605 (D. Mass 1982) and 
Estate of Davis v. United States, 340 F. Supp.2d 79 (D. Mass. 2004). In Schiller, the court found that the partner had 
actively participated in the false arrest of the plaintiff by the arresting officer. As to the subsequent beating by the 
arresting officer, the partner did not physically participate in that beating; however, the court found that, 
presumably as a result of his active participation in the arrest, the partner by his silence encouraged the beating 
itself. 540 F.Supp. at 620. In Davis, the plaintiff’s claim against FBI agents was based on negligence, not 
participation in an intentional tort; moreover, the plaintiffs claimed not merely the defendants’ failure to control 
informants who killed the plaintiff’s decedent, but also their active efforts to protect the informants in question. 
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fails to intervene in the sexual harassment of the plaintiff by fellow employees will be subject to liability 
for any intentional tort, such as battery, of which the fellow employees are liable.190 The federal cases 
cited in support of this illustration were not themselves common law tort actions, but were rather based 
on alleged violations of state discrimination law.191 The results in these cases were based on two 
predictions: first, that New Jersey courts would adopt Restatement Second’s Section 876(b) to establish 
aiding and abetting liability under the New Jersey statute; and, second, that inaction can form the basis 
of aiding and abetting liability under that section “if is [rises] to the level of ‘providing substantial 
assistance or encouragement.’”192 No common law cases were cited for the proposition that inaction 
can result in instigation or participation liability under Section 876(b) or otherwise. Moreover, the 
circumstances of these cases were highly unusual, in that under the relevant state anti-discrimination 
statute only the employer could be found liable as a principal, and the question was whether “a 
harassing supervisor [could] be individually liable for aiding and abetting the actionable conduct of his 
employer, when the challenged conduct is failing to stop the supervisor’s own harassment.”193 
 If an affirmative duty to act presumptively transfers from negligence law to the law of 
intentional torts, and if intentional tort liability can be predicated on a failure to make reasonable 
efforts, rather than a “refusal” to act, then the line between the intentional torts and negligence is 
becoming increasingly blurred. Of course, reasonableness has always been an important standard in 
determining when defendants are privileged to engage in conduct that would otherwise constitute an 
intentional tort,194 but it has never been the standard for determining when the plaintiff has established, 
prima facie, that the defendant’s conduct is in need of justification.195  
II. Distinguishing Intentional Torts From Negligence 
                                                          
190 Intentional Torts, P.D. No. 4 at Reporters’ Note to cmt b, Illustration 6.  
191 See Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 1999); Gardenshire v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 754 A.2d 
1244 (Law Div. 2000), cited in Section 10, Reporters note to comment b, (Preliminary Draft No. 4) at p. 58. In 
Gardenshire, the court dismissed actions against an insurer and insurance adjuster for aiding and abetting violation 
of a New Jersey anti-discrimination statute. In Hurley, the court held that a supervisor could be held liable for 
violation of both federal and state anti-discrimination statutes for failure to intervene in sexual harassment. With 
respect to the state law claim, the court relied on Section 876(b) of the Second Restatement on the ground that 
“inaction can form the basis of aiding and abetting if it rises to the level of providing substantial assistance or 
encouragement.” (emphasis added.). 174 F.3d at 126. For a discussion of the source of Hurley’s interpretation of 
Section 876(b), see infra notes 192-93 & accompanying text.  
192 Hurley,  at 126 (citing Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d ,__ 158, n. 11, which relied on Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 
F.3d 542, 553 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
193 Hurley, 174 F.3d at 126. 
194 See, e.g., Second Restatement § 892(2) (“If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be 
intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact.”); id. at § 63 (1) (“An 
actor is privileged to use reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, to defend 
himself against unprivileged harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm which he reasonably believes that 
another is about to inflict intentionally upon him.”)  
195 One possible exception is the intentional infliction of emotional harm, which requires not only that the actor 
intentionally “or recklessly” cause severe emotional harm to another, but also that the actor’s conduct is “extreme 
and outrageous.” Second Restatement §46. By definition, conduct that is “extreme and outrageous” is 
unreasonable, and it is the plaintiff’s burden, as part of the prima facie case, to prove such unreasonableness. This 
tort, however, is exceptional in that there are apparently no privileges which could be asserted to justify conduct 
that would otherwise be tortious. 
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 In Part I, I addressed the implications of the piecemeal process of consideration and adoption of 
both the different projects within the Third Restatement of Torts and the different sections within 
Intentional Torts. In this section, I pick up and expand on my last point, which is the extent to which this 
project has increasingly blurred the line between the intentional torts and negligence.  
 As the reporters clearly recognize, there are two sorts of practical ramifications of characterizing 
an action as either negligence or one of the intentional torts. The first set of consequences are “internal 
to tort doctrine,” and they include ignoring the comparative fault of the plaintiff, a broader scope of 
liability, and the ability to recover without proof of actual harm, either physical or emotional. 196  The 
second set of consequences are based on “collateral legal rules, i.e., on rule from outside tort doctrine, 
and they include both plaintiff-friendly rules, such as the ability to sue despite workers’ compensation, 
and defendant-friendly rules such as a shorter statute of limitations, sovereign immunity protection for 
government defendants and exclusion of insurance coverage.197 Both sorts of consequences have 
important practical effects on the litigants. I have previously joined the reporters in recommending that 
determining when collateral effects should flow should be considered independent of internal tort 
doctrine;198 however, I now conclude that this is unlikely to happen. As a result, we cannot simply ignore 
these external collateral effects (as well as the internal effects) of characterizing conduct as intentional 
rather than merely negligent. 
 In their Scope Note to the Intentional Torts project, the reporters attempt to describe what 
makes intentional torts “categorically distinct from other torts.”199 They state that “[t]hey are 
intentional because they involve an action that is intended to affect another person and that results in 
an invasion of the rights of another”200 and that “[u]nlike negligence, intentional torts upon persons 
cannot be committed through simple inadvertence.”201 It is true that intentional torts cannot be 
committed through mere inadvertence; even when omissions liability is recognized, the defendant must 
intend a particular result, such as knowing that the plaintiff will remain confined if the defendant does 
not use reasonable care to release him or her.202 But not all, or even most, negligent conduct is the 
result of mere inadvertence,203 and when it is not, the reporters have not adequately captured what 
features of intentional torts justify the consequences of that characterization. 
 It is not sufficient to say that these results are justified “because they involve an action that is 
intended to affect another person,”204 particularly when the manner in which they are so intended may 
be without any significant degree of fault, as is the case when single intent creates liability for a 
                                                          
196 Intentional Torts, T.D. No. 1 at 3 (Reporters’ Scope Note). 
197 Id. 
198 See id. at 4; Moore, supra note 2 at 1633. 
199 Intentional Torts, T.D. No. 1 at 3. 
200 Id. at 2. 
201 Id. at 3. 
202 See Intentional Torts, §7(a) (T.D. No. 2).. 
203 See, e.g., Liab. For Phys. and Emot. Harm, §1, cmt. b ((“[P]eople all the time voluntarily engage in conduct---
swinging a golf club, raising a stick so as to separate two dogs, turning a steering wheel in order to turn a car on a 
highway, selling a product, transmitting electricity through power lines. 
204 See supra note 200 & accompanying text. 
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defendant who intends some minor bodily contact but intends neither harm nor offense.205 Moreover, 
why attach such significance to the fact that an intended act “results in an invasion of the rights of 
another”206 when that invasion may be entirely unforeseeable, as when a contact not offensive to a 
reasonable sense of personal dignity unexpectedly results in serious physical harm? 
 The reporters further note that “the different intentional torts to persons developed differently 
as a historical matter, and are distinct in their structure and in the interests they protect.”207 Again, this 
is clearly correct, but it does not explain why we put our stamp of approval on these historical 
developments208 or why, at the very least, we don’t draw the line at expanding the availability of 
intentional tort recovery without having a clear idea of why intentional tort liability is warranted in such 
situations.209  
 Another perceived difference is that the interests protected by the intentional torts are the 
“fundamental interests in autonomy, dignity, and security.”210 Yet, at the reporters urging, the ALI has  
now recognized an entirely new tort of purposeful infliction of bodily harm,211 which protects against 
the very same interest thatgligence and strict liability. Similarly, the reporters have approved continuing 
a controversial change initiated by the Second Restatement, whereby plaintiffs unconscious of their 
confinement are permitted to sue in false imprisonment when their confinement results in harm, 
clarifying, however, that there must be bodily and not some other type of harm.212 
 Finally, the reporters explain that the shape of intentional torts is “more rule-like and more 
precise than negligence doctrines, which often take the form of flexible and general standards of 
reasonableness.”213 Of course, there has always been a general standard of “reasonableness” in 
determining the availability of the traditional affirmative defenses to intentional torts, such as apparent 
                                                          
205 See supra note 75 & accompanying text. As previously discussed, the plaintiff may have unexpectedly suffered 
severe bodily harm with substantial damages for which the defendant will be liable in battery, but not in 
negligence. See supra note 119 & accompanying text 
206 See supra note 200 & accompanying text. 
207 See Intentional Torts, T.D. No. 1 at 3. 
208 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 2 at 1645-1646 (“given that modern tort law now recognizes actions for intentional 
infliction of severe emotional distress, for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and for sexual harassment in 
the workplace, how far should courts be willing to go to protect either ‘bodily integrity’ or ‘bodily autonomy’?”). 
209 See, e.g., supra notesn173-74 & accompanying text (discussing expansion of liability in false imprisonment to 
include a negligent attempt to release someone from confinement). An example of expanded liability that was 
clearly warranted is the modern recognition of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm, including 
conduct that is merely reckless rather than intentional. See Liab. For Phys. & Emot. Harm §46 & cmt h. Given that 
there is no general duty to avoid the negligent infliction of emotional harm, recognition of the intentional tort was 
necessary to permit recovery for serious emotional harm in cases involving “extreme and outrageous” conduct. 
210 Intentional torts, T.D. No. 1 at 3. 
211 See supra note 27 & accompanying text. 
212 See supra notes 123-26 & accompanying text (Section 7(c) permits recovery when plaintiff is aware of 
confinement or suffers bodily harm as a result); T.D. No. 2 at Reporters’ Note to §7 (describing how Second 
Restatement differs from first Restatement in permitting unaware plaintiffs to recover in false imprisonment for 
bodily harm). See also Philip Halpern, “Intentional Torts and the Restatement: A Petition for Rehearing,” 7 Buffalo 
L. Rev. 7, 23-26  (1957) (describing and criticizing Second Restatement’s extension of liability when harm results as 
inconsistent with the historical limitation of the trespassory torts to situations in which harm is not required and 
also urging their either all or no unaware victims of confinement should be permitted to recover because the 
presence or absence of harm should be irrelevant). 
213 See Intentional Torts, T.D. No. 1 at 3. 
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consent, self-defense and defense of property.214 More important, the  Intentional Torts reporters are 
crafting new provisions that rely on even vaguer standards, for example, the implied-in-law privilege, 
under which a defendant must establish  a reasonable belief that his or her otherwise tortious conduct 
was “necessary to further public policies or private interests that substantially outweigh the gravity of 
the invasion.”215 
 The medical treatment area is one in which there is a pressing need to better define the 
boundary lines between battery and negligence. If a physician deliberately acts without the consent of 
the patient, including knowing extensions of the scope of treatment, then the decision to treat the 
bodily contact as a battery seems totally justifiable.216 But if a physician is merely negligent in acting 
without such consent, as when the physician inadvertently operates on the wrong limb, why isn’t the 
action in negligence clearly preferable to treating the physician as an intentional tortfeasor?217 Professor 
Simons has responded by arguing both that intentional tort law is more plaintiff-friendly because it 
includes recovery for a broader scope of damages218 and that an action in battery is necessary to 
vindicate the plaintiff’s reasonable sense of dignity.219 I see no reason to presumptively favor plaintiff-
friendly doctrines, at least in the absence of substantial moral fault on the part of the defendant 
                                                          
214 Even here, the standard of reasonableness is not open-ended, as it is in negligence, where “[a] person acts 
negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances.” Liab. For Phys. and Emot. 
Harm, §3. Rather, the defendant must act reasonably with respect to fairly specific standards, such as the use of 
“reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm” to defend against harmful or 
offensive contact “which he reasonably believes that [the plaintiff’ is about to inflict intentionally upon him.” 
Second Restatement §63 (Self-Defense by Force Not Threatening Death or Serious Bodily Harm). See also, e.g., 
Second Restatement §77 (privilege “to use reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily 
harm, to prevent or terminate another’s intrusion upon the actor’s land or chattels”); Second Restatement 892(2) 
(“If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent 
consent and are as effective as consent in fact.”). 
215 P.D. No. 4 at §17(b)(2). See also supra notes 167-174 & accompanying text (Reporters’ recommendation for an 
extension of liability for omissions in false imprisonment to include negligent attempts to release another from 
confinement). 
216 See, e.g., Intentional Torts, P.D. No. 4 at §14, Illustration 1 to cmt. b (physician decided to operate on patient’s 
left ear rather than on right ear, despite fact that patient had expressly consented only to operation on right ear).  
217 The reporters’ draft of Section  14 (Scope of Actual Consent) provides that “[a] person’s actual consent does not 
extend to conduct of the actor that is substantially different in nature from the conduct that the person is 
subjectively willing to permit.” Although the comment to that section does not expressly address a situation in 
which the substantial difference is attributable to the physician’s negligent rather than intentional deviation, a 
comment to another section makes clear that the reporters are rejecting cases holding that “a medical practitioner 
is not liable for a battery unless he or she ‘intentionally deviated’ from the scope of the consent that was originally 
given.” Id. at §16, cmt d. See also Moore, supra note 2 at 1648-53 (arguing in favor of the intentional deviation 
standard).It should be noted that if the physician’s mistake is reasonable, then the physician may rely on the 
apparent consent privilege. See id at 138. The concern, therefore, is with situations in which a physician negligently 
(i.e., unreasonably) operates beyond the scope of the plaintiff’s consent, as when he or she inadvertently operates 
on the wrong limb, having failed to take reasonable precautions to avoid doing so.  
218 Email from Ken Simons to Nancy Moore, Feb. 20, 2017 (pointing out that negligence requires physical harm and 
that even when physical harm occurs, if the physician performed the operation properly, courts would permit 
recovery for a bad side-effect under a battery but not a negligence theory). 
219 See, e.g., Intentional Torts, P.D. No. 4 at §19 a, cmt b (“courts treat any physical touching in the context of 
medical treatment that is beyond the scope of the patient’s consent as offensive to a reasonable sense of dignity 
as a matter or law”). 
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(beyond that of negligence).220 And in the vast majority of medical treatment cases, I suspect that 
patients are far more concerned with a physician’s potential incompetence than with a possible invasion 
of the patient’ s personal dignity. Certainly that is the case when the physician inadvertently extends the 
scope of treatment by operating on the wrong limb. If the gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint is the 
physician’s incompetence, then I see no reason why the appropriate action should be in intentional tort 
rather than negligence. 
 It is not my intent here to suggest precisely how tort law should characterize the difference 
between intentional tort and other torts, especially negligence, but rather to express my 
disappointment that the Intentional Torts project has not done more to adequately address this issue. 
Indeed, I am most disappointed that rather than clarifying what the boundaries should be and what the 
justification should be for drawing lines, the Intentional Torts project has added to the current confusion 
on this question, particularly in the provisions that differ substantially from the Second Restatement. 
And I further suggest that, in large part, the reason for the continued confusion may lie in the piecemeal 
process by which the Third Restatement has been adopted, including most prominently, the incorrect 
and misleading provision in Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm regarding the distinction between 
liability for the intentional and negligent causation of physical harm. 
Conclusion 
 Given extensive developments in tort law since the adoption of the Second Restatement in 
1965, the need for a Third Restatement of Torts was obvious,. These developments were most striking 
in the subjects covered by the now-completed Third Restatement projects, including Products Liability, 
Apportionment of Harm, and Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (based primarily on negligence or 
strict liability). It was unfortunate, however, that in planning these separate projects, the ALI initially 
assumed that there was no need to restate the intentional torts because the law was both clear and 
uniform. As Professors Simons and Bublick have persuasively argued, intentional torts doctrine is neither 
clear nor uniform; moreover, there is no obvious unifying theory that explains the distinctions between 
the intentional and the nonintentional torts. 
 The ALI now seeks to correct this mistake, but certain aspects of its process have complicated 
the reporters’ task. Section 5 of earlier adopted Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm purports to 
establish an umbrella rule for intentional torts resulting in physical harm, but it inaccurately describes 
intentional tort doctrine. In addition, that section (and others) appear to assume a hierarchy of fault and 
a dual intent standard for battery, both of which are ostensibly rejected in the Intentional Torts project. 
There is no plan to revise Section 5 (or other relevant sections of Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm) or even to unify the separate projects into a single document; as a result, these contradictions 
and inconsistencies will inevitably confuse both judges and lawyers seeking to understand intentional 
tort doctrine through the various projects of the Third Restatement. 
                                                          
220 Of course, it is also the case that there may be more defendant-friendly consequences of labeling the 
physician’s conduct as intentional rather than negligent, including a shorter statute of limitations, sovereign 
immunity, and a lack of insurance coverage (which may discourage plaintiffs’ attorneys from taking the case even 
when the physician has personal assets to cover an adverse judgment). See supra note 197 & accompanying text 
(discussing the collateral consequences of characterizing a tort as intentional). 
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 The separate drafting and adoption of these different projects has had other adverse 
consequences. For example, the Second Restatement left open the possibility of recognizing liability for 
negligent false imprisonment; however, such a tort does not fit neatly into either Liability for Physical 
and Emotional Harm or Intentional Torts. Thus the possibility goes unaddressed. Similarly, Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm did not restate the law of professional malpractice. As a result, Intentional 
Torts cannot adequately differentiate negligence and battery in situations where a physician mistakenly 
believes that the patient consented to medical treatment. 
 Even within the single Intentional Torts project, the piecemeal adoption of various sections has 
undermined the consistency and coherence of that project. Not knowing what these future related 
sections would provide, the ALI has already voted on issues that will be impacted by those later sections. 
Theoretically, the membership could reconsider the earlier adopted sections, but this is not likely to 
occur. Thus the favorable vote on single over dual intent will likely make necessary the subsequent 
adoption of an entirely new “implied-in-law” consent, with its attendant difficulties of interpretation 
and application---all of which could have been avoided if the dual intent standard had been adopted. 
Similarly, the membership has voted on some but not all of the sections that implicate liability for 
omissions, but their current drafts reflect a both a lack of consistency across sections (for example, no 
liability for omissions in battery, but liability for participation in a battery can be based on an omission) 
as well as a failure to clearly differentiate between a duty to act in negligence and a duty to act in 
intentional torts. 
 Although there is much to admire in the Intentional Torts project, my greatest disappointment is 
its failure to take on Professor Bublick’s challenge to articulate and implement a conceptual view of the 
distinction between the intentional and the nonintentional torts. Rather, instead of clarifying the line 
between them, the project often blurs that line. This occurs both in the project’s treatment of liability 
for some omissions (in which a duty to act is simply borrowed from the duty to act in negligence cases) 
and in its approval  of physicians’ liability for battery rather than negligence when they mistakenly 
extend treatment (such as by operating on the wrong limb). There are important practical consequences 
of the decision to locate liability in battery rather than negligence,, but the project reporters do not 
adequately explain how to distinguish between the two. 
 The reporters should not necessarily be faulted for the conceptual inadequacy of the project. 
Tort law scholarship has not paid much attention to the conceptual underpinnings of the intentional 
torts,221 and the reporters have been kept busy working through the multitude of challenging issues that 
arise in articulating and applying intentional tort law doctrine. We can only hope that the salience of the 
ALI undertaking the Intentional Torts project will prompt tort law scholars to provide the theoretical 
justification for continuing to distinguish between intentional and nonintentional torts.222  
                                                          
221 Professors Simons and Bublick have both attempted to articulate the conceptual differences between the 
intentional and non-intentional torts. See supra notes 6-12; 17 & accompanying text. For other commentators who 
have made similar efforts, see, e.g., Halpern, supra note 46; Cane, supra note 46; Epstein, supra note 46. See also 
John Finnis, “Intention in Tort Law,” in David G. Owen, ed., Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 229 (1995).  
222 At least one commentator has recently argued that a more comprehensive Restatement (Fourth) of Torts would 
divide torts into only two categories---fault and no-fault---with no separate category of intentional torts. See 
Stephen D. Sugarman, “Rethinking Tort Doctrine: visions of a Restatement (Fourth) of Torts, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 585 




   
